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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070014-9

11/17/75

NOTE FOR: *to* The Director *Noted by DGT 7/17/75*

SUBJECT: DIA Warning Appraisal--Egypt
Bill -

1. As you can discern from the attached memorandum (Tab A), we have dealt directly and privately with Danny Graham on the subject of his warning appraisal of 7 March containing his judgment that Sadat was about to initiate hostilities.
2. While he disagrees with the thrust of our criticism, Danny took it well and has provided a thoughtful response. He seems particularly to appreciate the manner in which it was handled.

3. [] originally had recommended in his critique (Tab B--see paper clip) that we adopt certain guidelines via the USIB forum concerning interagency coordination on matters of this sort, as well as procedures at the USIB table itself. I believe that this is no longer necessary nor desirable. As [] puts it, a flag has been raised and a clear intent to keep watch implied. Danny has been sensitized without his feelings being hurt.

4. Recommend we consider this matter closed.

Well done
Sometimes we are over the top
can be given

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA.
D/DCI/IO

DIA
review(s)
completed.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

IC 15- 2810

1 July 1975

C-0078/DR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SUBJECT: IC Staff Critique of DIA Warning Appraisal of 7 March (U)

25X1 1. (C) I am afraid that I am in simple disagreement with the main thrust of [] critique of the DIA Appraisal on the likelihood of war published on 7 March. Looking back over the intelligence take, I don't think I would have recommended it being handled any differently. I call your attention to the recent IIR showing the Bayesian results from Community analysts on the question of war in the Middle East. I think the sharp peaking of expectation among Community analysts around 7 March strongly indicates that somebody should have run up the flag as we did. As far as the judgment in the NIB which I changed myself at the USIB table is concerned, I still believe that it reads exactly the way it should have. Finally, [] points out that Sadat had, in fact, been engaged in preparation for major hostilities in March. [] does not indicate that our timing was on the button, it does indicate that warning was in order. Also it is interesting to read the 14 March NID appraisal by a CIA analyst who seemed also bothered by the data we quoted in the warning appraisal and who was only slightly less pessimistic than DIA.

25X1 2. (C) I am a little worried by this type of critique in that it can put us back in the old situation where we worry so much about false alarms that we fail to warn against real crises or hostilities. There is a direct correlation between the user's willingness to be surprised and his willingness to accept some false alarms. If he is willing to accept an unlimited number of false alarms, he will have a very low likelihood of ever being surprised. On the other hand, if he is willing to accept no false alarms, he is almost certain to be surprised. I would worry if we became imbalanced in favor of too many false alarms, but recent history has not indicated that this is our Community problem. With these points in mind, I would recommend against a new set of rules for warning based on a critique of our 7 March appraisal.


Classified by 01A
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED TO TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1995

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3. (C) I very much appreciate the way in which this critique was handled. Had it been simply published, we would have been in bureaucratic fights. As it is, only Linc Faurer and I have gone over the critique. I do not have a large number of analysts looking to me to make a public defense which, of course, I would have done if this paper had been disseminated broadly. Rest assured that I appreciate thoughtful criticism even when I don't agree with it.



DANIEL O. GRAHAM
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

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23 April 1975
Copy No. 1

DCI

MEMORANDUM FOR:

D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT:

PRD Study of Recent Intelligence
Coverage of Egyptian Military
Capabilities and Intentions

1. This is in some respects a new paper. I have condensed, reorganized, rewritten, and recast much of the original draft and its addendum and, most important, have placed the problem in an entirely new context. Our conclusions and recommendations, however, remain the same.

2. This remains, I think, a forceful paper, but it is more diplomatic than the earlier version and more "legitimate" in the sense of PRD's overall mission. Point is, I think we can now show this to General Graham and also, after his reading, give it to other USIB principals as well--a procedure which departs from my earlier proposal that we show the original to Graham and prepare a new, greatly modified version for USIB. DIA isn't going to like it, but they get what they deserve.

3. I suggest that, if you approve, we make the appropriate recommendations to the DCI (who still--as recommended earlier--should chat privately with Graham when he turns the paper over to him).

4. I call your particular attention to the opening section called "Background, Conclusions, and Recommendations," which is entirely new.

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DCI
Does this do it?

[Redacted Signature Box]

Chief, PRD/IC

Attachment: *the*

[Redacted Box]

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Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC	✓		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Apologies for ~~let~~
 losing this in my
 pile - Let's go
 ahead + I'll raise
 it with J/DIA -

DCI/DBCI

5/24/75

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23 April 1975BACKGROUND, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There have been until fairly recently few grounds for complaint about the Intelligence Community's handling of crucial questions concerning war or peace in the Middle East. Treatment in current intelligence publications and in estimative pieces had been, on the whole, thorough and well-balanced, even restrained. Analysts, though foreseeing grave risks of war by summer or fall, had stoutly resisted the impulse (and probably the temptation) to overemphasize the danger of conflict in the immediate future--their mettle all the more commendable in view of their well-publicized failure to forewarn of war in 1973.

But these admirable circumstances did not survive the winter. In early March, DIA, without reference to overwhelmingly contrary opinion elsewhere in the Community, issued a highly alarmist Warning Appraisal which, inter alia, implied that--partly because the Egyptians had allegedly been secretly rearmed by the Soviets--Cairo would be on the verge of war by the end of the month. This was followed in mid-March by an article in the CIA's National Intelligence Daily--headlined "Egypt Ready to Initiate War If Current [Kissinger] Talks Fail"--which was also alarmist, though less so than the Appraisal. And then, on 27 March, at the behest of DIA, USIB agreed at the

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last minute to alter a rather calm and judicious Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) by inserting in its Conclusions the warning that full-scale war between the Arabs and Israel might break out within the next few days.

None of the dire predictions, of course, came true, and none of them appear to have been warranted at the time. At least one of the papers, the Warning Appraisal, seems to have generated substantial confusion and concern among its readers. And the procedures followed by USIB when it amended the SNIE seem in retrospect hasty and ill-advised.

The study which follows addresses these problems, concentrating on the bureaucratic and substantive nature of the DIA Warning Appraisal of 7 March (and a companion Interagency Memorandum published the day before) and the circumstances attending the USIB meeting of 27 March. It concludes, inter alia, that:

- Intelligence coverage concerning the chances of war in the Middle East was overly alarmist during March. At least some of this coverage misled or confused other elements of the Community and policymakers as well.

- A DIA Warning Appraisal and a USIB-approved Estimate published during this period used evidence in a careless and eccentric way to sustain warnings of imminent hostilities.

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- NSC staffers, State Department officials, CIA officers in the field, the Defense Attache in Cairo, and the National Intelligence Officers for the Middle East were all unhappy about the evidence used and the conclusions drawn in the Warning Appraisal.

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We recommend on the basis of these conclusions that USIB adopt new guidelines concerning both interagency coordination and procedures at the USIB table itself. Specifically, we propose that:

- Departmental publications dealing with subjects already treated during the same period by national issuances should refer to the earlier publications and specifically identify any major differences in treatment and conclusions; such publications should, in addition, note the absence of coordination.

- USIB principals who propose major changes in the conclusions of an Estimate during USIB meetings

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should, if their proposals are based on new information, request that the paper under consideration be remanded for possible revision; USIB itself, in session, should not assume the responsibility for assessing the veracity and implications of new information.

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THE WARNING APPRAISAL PROBLEM

1. In early March, elements of the Intelligence Community issued two memoranda concerning Egyptian military capabilities and intentions. One was an NIO-sponsored Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IM) entitled "Gaps in Egypt's Military Inventory and Effects on Its Wartime Capabilities," published on 6 March. DIA participated in the development of this paper. The other was a DIA Warning Intelligence Appraisal (WA) entitled "Sadat Develops Plans and Capabilities to Exercise Military Options," which was issued on 7 March. These two papers, published almost simultaneously, presented significantly divergent views on the status of the Egyptian rearmament program and, by implication, the prospects for renewed hostilities between Egypt and Israel. Readers were understandably confused and concerned.

2. As stated in its introductory note, the coordinated Inter-agency Memorandum "was developed to provide judgments on Egypt's present and prospective capabilities for engaging in another round of hostilities with Israel." It was drafted in CIA in consultation with representatives of DIA, NSA, and INR. Prepared under the aegis of the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle

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the paper received final coordination (between CIA, DIA, and INR/State) on 27-28 February but was not published until 6 March.*

3. The DIA Warning Appraisal was prompted, according to DIA, by a Navy report of 4 March which stated that Egypt and the USSR were seeking in concert to persuade the West that their relations were strained when, in fact, their relations were excellent. Indeed, the report asserted that the Soviets were secretly resupplying Egypt with military equipment. This particular report, DIA says, was received too late to affect its coordination of the Interagency Memorandum.

4. Clearly, the two intelligence publications were intended for different purposes. Both papers deal, in large part, with the same material, i.e., Egyptian military capabilities and Soviet resupply. But the NIO paper concerns itself with hardware and, largely but not entirely, limits itself to estimating Egyptian military capabilities. The DIA Appraisal is broader in scope; it covers capabilities and intentions and warns its readers that "...Sadat has placed Egypt in a position where he can adopt a military option at any time he feels appropriate."

5. Taken together, the two papers tend to confuse more than they clarify. The reasons for this are apparent when statements drawn from the two papers are juxtaposed, as below:

* This seven-day gap between final coordination and publication was due exclusively to delays occasioned by the mechanics of editing, printing, etc. For intelligence products that deal with fast-moving current developments, a delay of this magnitude is clearly undesirable and invites the kind of problems mentioned in the preceding instance.

Approved For Release 2008/01/03 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070014-9

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On Egypt's M...
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070014-9

"Egypt's overall military capabilities are somewhat less than prior to the October war... Vis-a-vis Israel... Egyptian armed forces are weaker than in October 1973."

"He [Sadat] has restored his armed forces to a capability and posture approximating that existing prior to hostilities in October 1973..." [No net assessment offered.]

"The Egyptian armed forces currently are estimated to be capable of a strong defense against an Israeli attack or of mounting a major offensive of a few day's duration in the Sinai."

"[Sadat] is now capable of exercising a credible military option." [No explanation of what is meant by credible.]

"[Completion of Soviet re-supply actions]... would provide Egypt with sufficient equipment to conduct a 30 to 40 day war with Israel."

- On Equipment Shortages

"The Egyptian armed forces have shortages of certain major military equipment, particularly aircraft..."
"...recent deliveries of Soviet aircraft and other military equipment (believed to be under prewar contracts) have not been sufficient to restore war losses."

"Ambiguous statements have projected an impression that serious shortages exist in Egypt's armed forces. Actually... [Sadat] has extensively reorganized, trained, and perhaps deceptively rearmed his armed forces through a variety of efforts."

- On Soviet Resupply

"A full-scale resumption of Soviet military aid to Egypt presumably is depending [sic] on Cairo's willingness to improve the complete spectrum of its relations with Moscow..."

"There are reports that the resumption of aircraft deliveries is part of a massive Soviet re-supply effort initiated last January to complete the rearmament of Egypt by the end of this month."

"...the Soviet resupply effort during and immediately after the October 1973 war replenished most major military equipment losses..."

- On Spare Parts and Ammunition

"Although there is little information on Egyptian stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts, it is doubtful that Egypt could support sustained major military action without further Soviet resupply."

"If...severe ammunition shortages do exist, it would seem that training rounds would be curtailed... [Furthermore]...no feverish activity Egyptians to procure ammunition supplies have been noted, which alleged..."

TOP SECRET

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Interagency Memo

DIA Warning Appraisal

critical shortages could expect to precipitate. The logic of the above suggests that the Egyptian Army believes it has sufficient stocks to support offensive operations."

6. As thus can be seen, the IM states that Egypt is weaker vis-a-vis Israel than it was prior to October 1973 and that this is so, in part, because the Egyptian armed forces had not received sufficient resupply (from the Soviet Union or anywhere else) to make up for the losses incurred during the war. The DIA paper is silent about Israeli capabilities but, using much the same evidence, constructs what is essentially a three-part conclusion (missing in the IM): (1) the Egyptian armed forces are ready for action now--a judgment which does not flatly contradict the IM, though there are important differences between the two papers concerning what kind of action the Egyptians are said to be actually ready for;* (2) the Egyptian military might, in fact, be far better equipped than many suspect (and, in fact, the recent IM had suggested); and (3) implicit in the piece as a whole (and made explicit by DIA in another paper on the subject issued on 27 March), Sadat, possessing "a credible military option," might attack Israel very soon.

* The Appraisal cites "several convincing reports" to support the view that Sadat has ordered a shift in his army's orientation from defensive to offensive planning. This, coupled with reporting of Soviet resupply actions which "... would provide Egypt with sufficient equipment to conduct a 30 to 40 day war with Israel..." conveys DIA's apparent (though unstated) belief that Egypt may now be capable of sustaining an offensive military operation for some time. The Interagency Memorandum, however, is unequivocal in its conclusion that the Egyptian armed forces are estimated to be capable of only "... few days' duration..."

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TOP SECRET

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Approved For Release 2008/07/03 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070014-9

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7. The WA is a departmental assessment which did not require coordination or consultation with other agencies. It did, however, receive wide dissemination within the Community, going to, inter alia, the White House, Vice-President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the NSC Staff.*

8. Some of the confusion generated by the issuance of this Appraisal immediately after the appearance of the Interagency Memorandum could have been avoided had DIA explained the circumstances which prompted the issuance of its own publication. Specifically, we believe the DIA Appraisal should have referred to the Interagency Memorandum, briefly described the substantive differences between the two papers, and explained the reasons for those differences. Indeed, we believe that, as a general rule, departmental publications disseminated to senior policymaking levels should note the absence of coordination and that such publications dealing with subjects already treated during the same period by national issuances should refer to the earlier publications and specifically identify any major differences in treatment and conclusions.

CONTROVERSIAL JUDGMENTS

9. The stated intention of the DIA Appraisal is to warn consumers that Sadat would exercise "...military alternatives should diplomatic

* The widespread dissemination of uncoordinated departmental estimative products to the most senior policy levels of the US Government is a practice which involves obvious risks of sowing confusion. A related concern is the provision to US military commanders of information supported by the Intelligence Community.

Approved For Release 2008/07/03 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070014-9

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activity fail...", and that he had "...taken the highly pragmatic steps of rearming the Egyptian armed forces...."

10. The Appraisal was based largely on a single [] report. The source of that report, [] is listed as fairly reliable. But this particular report summarizes statements made to the source by two sub-sources, whose reliability was not known to DIA during the preparation of the Warning Appraisal. 25X1

11. It is, in any event, the main thrust of the [] report--and DIA's implicit sanctioning of that thrust--which caused the most controversy. The report states that "during December 1974 Egyptian leaders in Moscow⁷ were assured of full Soviet rearmament support"; that "Egypt hopes to have completed Soviet resupply by the end of March 1975"; and that "...Sadat and the Soviets agreed...to keep the West from knowing Egypt was being rearmed." The report also claims that the Soviets, under this "agreement," are secretly resupplying Egypt so that it will "be able to conduct a 30 to 40 day war against Israel by" the end of March. They are allegedly shipping equipment via Libya, and Sadat is said to have agreed with the Soviets to dissemble by "continuing his public complaints on the lack of Soviet support." 25X1

12. Expert observers hold serious reservations about these claims. For example:

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--The US Defense Attache in Cairo believes the report describes!... a much better Egyptian-Soviet relationship than we believe to exist and to credit Egypt with equipment deliveries... which we believe are grossly exaggerated. . . . Source and/or sub-sources have appeared to provide information which is, at a minimum, grossly exaggerated or even patently untrue. "



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The question of Soviet supplies being transhipped from Libya to Egypt is not discernible from any [other] reporting received from any source to date. "

--And in our independent investigation of the evidence and in our discussions with analysts at NSA, NPIC, and CIA/DDI, we could find no evidence whatsoever to corroborate [REDACTED] report of a Soviet agreement to undertake a "massive" resupply of Egypt or of a Soviet/Egyptian pact to hide their true relationship.

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13. The DIA paper's use of other evidence can also be subjected to criticism. Key sentences from the paper's section on Soviet deliveries read as follows:

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[redacted] the largest amount of military equipment awaiting export since the October war. Approximately 54 tanks, 134 APCs, 62 ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft guns, and 12 aircraft shipping crates were among the items observed. It cannot be established that Egypt has received a large share of it, but neither can it be fully accounted for in other countries. "

14. The claim that photography revealed the "largest amount of military equipment awaiting export since the October war" is highly misleading. What is not said is that most of that equipment was trucks, and that the figures cited in the paragraph for tanks, APCs, AA guns, and aircraft awaiting shipment from the port were not unusually high. Further, no one knows whether Egypt received any of this equipment (much less a "large share"), and, in any case, the Intelligence Community has no way of accounting for it, in any precise way, in other countries.

15. The Appraisal ignores certain political considerations which have an important bearing on Soviet-Egyptian relations and a possible "massive Soviet resupply" effort. The DLA paper seems to assume that Sadat, who in 1972 expelled Soviet advisors to protect Egyptian independence, would accept the kind of dependence on the USSR that a massive rearmament would imply, or, conversely, that the Soviet Union would suddenly, after a seven-month hiatus, and for reasons not addressed in the Appraisal, agree to send

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arms shipments of the magnitude required to completely rearm Egypt.

16. Finally, in the period since the dissemination of the [] report and DIA's subsequent implied blessing of it, elements of the Community have reviewed the evidence concerning possible secret Soviet resupply and found it overwhelmingly negative. And no additional reports have been received in the interim which would tend to support the original [] report or any of its specifics. It is our considered view that the report was sufficiently alarming in its implications to justify a DIA appraisal, but it was not (and is not) sufficiently credible to merit anything other than skeptical treatment.

CONSUMER REACTION

17. We have interviewed a number of senior officials concerning their reactions to the Appraisal. Specifically, we learned from discussions with members of the NSC Staff that the DIA Appraisal had not been received by Secretary Kissinger during his most recent trip to the Middle East, though the NSC Staff itself had received copies. A staff member said he had not forwarded it to Dr. Kissinger because, in his view, it was unnecessarily alarmist in tone and contained glaring and potentially damaging misstatements.

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
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18. State Department officials on both the Egyptian and Israeli desks reacted very unfavorably to the DIA Appraisal. Principally at their urging, INR forwarded a summary of both the Interagency (though not the papers themselves) Memorandum and the DIA Appraisal/to the Kissinger delegation in Egypt and expressed concern over DIA's conclusions. This summary commented as follows: "The suggestion of Egyptian-Soviet collusion is simply not credible.... We believe this DIA analysis has been heavily influenced by one of its clandestine sources who has recently stressed the idea of Egyptian duplicity in his reports. In addition, the Appraisal appears to reflect the views of IDF military intelligence conveyed to Pentagon officials who have recently visited Israel...."

19. In discussions with senior officials in DOD, we learned that departmental intelligence briefings and estimates had for a number of months conveyed very clearly the view that Egypt's major equipment losses suffered in the October war had "generally been replaced" and that current equipment inventories carried in the DIA Order of Battle approximately matched pre-war figures.

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20. The question of whether or not the Egyptians were being resupplied by the Soviets was being debated in DOD several weeks before the publication of the Warning Appraisal and Interagency Memorandum. The differences between the Interagency Memorandum and the Warning Appraisal on this point were thus not surprising to DOD officials; they simply represented another chapter in the debate. In any event, the papers were viewed by those we interviewed as further evidence that the Community did not have solid and credible intelligence to support its judgments. One interviewee indicated that he thought the Community was "spooked" on the Middle East--that failing as it did to provide forewarning of the October war, it was perhaps overreacting to indications of hostilities now, determined not to get caught short again. This has tended to heighten consumer skepticism regarding the validity of intelligence reporting.

21. In sum, we discovered among consumers a mixture of concern, confusion, suspicion, and relative indifference. We also encountered in both State and Defense the strong suspicion that the Israelis were perhaps unduly influencing (and inflating) US intelligence judgments concerning Egyptian military capabilities.

USIB AND THE SNIE

22. We have not conducted interviews with consumers concerning the recent SNIE 30-1-75, "Next Steps in the Middle East." But one particularly alarmist conclusion in that document, 30-1-75, of

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a piece with the earlier warnings discussed above and probably occasioned similar discontent among concerned readers. Specifically, the SNIE stated: "...there is a substantial chance that either the Arabs or the Israelis will deliberately or by miscalculation resume hostilities at any time. Indeed, we have disturbing indications on the Egyptian front that raise the possibility of an Egyptian-initiated attack or an Israeli preemption within the next few days."

23. As originally drafted, the SNIE stated that "There is a slightly better than even chance that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis will deliberately resort to war in the immediate future." The change from this rather reassuring formula was made as a consequence of a proposal of the Director of DIA at the USIB meeting of 27 March. The other members of USIB accepted at face value the evidence that war might be imminent then offered by DIA, and the SNIE was altered accordingly. But the amendments to the estimate were not supported by most of the analysts in the Community (who were not consulted by USIB) and, with hindsight, the published SNIE now appears less valid than the earlier, less alarmist, draft.

24. The DIA position, as represented at USIB, was based essentially on one of its own publications, a Special Defense Intelligence Notice (SDIN), which was issued on the same day that USIB met (27 March).*

* Because of the timing of the SDIN (it was published at 0830) and also because analysts outside of DIA did not believe [redacted] sufficient to warrant a change in the SNIE, USIB principals, other than the Director, DIA, were not informed of the SDIN's judgments

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Entitled, "There Are Growing Indications that Sadat May

Select a Military Option," the SDIN is similar in tone to the 7 March DIA Warning Appraisal. In fact, it refers to that Appraisal's principal conclusion and warns that "...there are convincing military indications that point to the increased possibility of war" and that "Egypt may be planning a major military action on or about 28 March."

26. To support these warnings, the SDIN lists these eight indicators:

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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070014-9

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800070014-9

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28. When DIA was queried on the substance of NSA's SIGINT analysis, the DIA representatives generally did not criticize the NSA position. They admitted that "weaknesses" could be found in individual indicators, but contended that, given the current atmosphere in the Middle East, these "bits and pieces" taken together simply could not be ignored. In any case, despite the arguments from NSA, DIA still believed that the SIGINT indicators presented in their SDIN pointed to "the increased possibility of war."

29. In view of all the above, we believe that USIB principals who propose major changes in the conclusions of an NIE or SNIE during USIB meetings should, if the^{ir} request reflects new information and there has been little or no forewarning of such proposals, request that the paper under consideration be remanded for possible revision: ^{if} ^{in session,} USIB itself/should not assume the responsibility for assessing the veracity of important new information without adequate advance preparation.

When time is of the essence, the NIE should be revised with their

H [redacted]

C [redacted]

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colleagues to make appropriate changes and then seek telephonic
concurrence from the USIB principals.

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